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# Authors: John Dennis <jdennis@redhat.com> # # Copyright (C) 2011 Red Hat # see file 'COPYING' for use and warranty information # # This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify # it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by # the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or # (at your option) any later version. # # This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, # but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of # MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the # GNU General Public License for more details. # # You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License # along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
Session Support for IPA John Dennis <jdennis@redhat.com>
Goals =====
Provide per-user session data caching which persists between requests. Desired features are:
* Integrates cleanly with minimum impact on existing infrastructure.
* Provides maximum security balanced against real-world performance demands.
* Sessions must be able to be revoked (flushed).
* Should be flexible and easy to use for developers.
* Should leverage existing technology and code to the maximum extent possible to avoid re-invention, excessive implementation time and to benefit from robustness in field proven components commonly shared in the open source community.
* Must support multiple independent processes which share session data.
* System must function correctly if session data is available or not.
* Must be high performance.
* Should not be tied to specific web servers or browsers. Should integrate with our chosen WSGI model.
Issues ======
Cookies -------
Most session implementations are based on the use of cookies. Cookies have some inherent problems.
* User has the option to disable cookies.
* User stored cookie data is not secure. Can be mitigated by setting flags indicating the cookie is only to be used with SSL secured HTTP connections to specific web resources and setting the cookie to expire at session termination. Most modern browsers enforce these.
Where to store session data? ----------------------------
Session data may be stored on either on the client or on the server. Storing session data on the client addresses the problem of session data availability when requests are serviced by independent web servers because the session data travels with the request. However there are data size limitations. Storing session data on the client also exposes sensitive data but this can be mitigated by encrypting the session data such that only the server can decrypt it.
The more conventional approach is to bind session data to a unique name, the session ID. The session ID is transmitted to the client and the session data is paired with the session ID on the server in a associative data store. The session data is retrieved by the server using the session ID when the receiving the request. This eliminates exposing sensitive session data on the client along with limitations on data size. It however introduces the issue of session data availability when requests are serviced by more than one server process.
Multi-process session data availability ---------------------------------------
Apache (and other web servers) fork child processes to handle requests in parallel. Also web servers may be deployed in a farm where requests are load balanced in round robin fashion across different nodes. In both cases session data cannot be stored in the memory of a server process because it is not available to other processes, either sibling children of a master server process or server processes on distinct nodes.
Typically this is addressed by storing session data in a SQL database. When a request is received by a server process containing a session ID in it's cookie data the session ID is used to perform a SQL query and the resulting data is then attached to the request as it proceeds through the request processing pipeline. This of course introduces coherency issues.
For IPA the introduction of a SQL database dependency is undesired and should be avoided.
Session data may also be shared by independent processes by storing the session data in files.
An alternative solution which has gained considerable popularity recently is the use of a fast memory based caching server. Data is stored in a single process memory and may be queried and set via a light weight protocol using standard socket mechanisms, memcached is one example. A typical use is to optimize SQL queries by storing a SQL result in shared memory cache avoiding the more expensive SQL operation. But the memory cache has distinct advantages in non-SQL situations as well.
Possible implementations for use by IPA =======================================
Apache Sessions ---------------
Apache has 2.3 has implemented session support via these modules:
mod_session Overarching session support based on cookies.
See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.3/mod/mod_session.html
mod_session_cookie Stores session data in the client.
See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.3/mod/mod_session_cookie.html
mod_session_crypto Encrypts session data for security. Encryption key is shared configuration parameter visible to all Apache processes and is stored in a configuration file.
See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.3/mod/mod_session_crypto.html
mod_session_dbd Stores session data in a SQL database permitting multiple processes to access and share the same session data.
See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.3/mod/mod_session_dbd.html
Issues with Apache sessions ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Although Apache has implemented generic session support and Apache is our web server of preference it nonetheless introduces issues for IPA.
* Session support is only available in httpd >= 2.3 which at the time of this writing is currently only available as a Beta release from upstream. We currently only ship httpd 2.2, the same is true for other distributions.
* We could package and ship the sessions modules as a temporary package in httpd 2.2 environments. But this has the following consequences:
- The code has to be backported. the module API has changed slightly between httpd 2.2 and 2.3. The backporting is not terribly difficult and a proof of concept has been implemented.
- We would then be on the hook to package and maintain a special case Apache package. This is maintenance burden as well as a distribution packaging burden. Both of which would be best avoided if possible.
* The design of the Apache session modules is such that they can only be manipulated by other Apache modules. The ability of consumers of the session data to control the session data is simplistic, constrained and static during the period the request is processed. Request handlers which are not native Apache modules (e.g. IPA via WSGI) can only examine the session data via request headers and reset it in response headers.
* Shared session data is available exclusively via SQL.
However using the 2.3 Apache session modules would give us robust session support implemented in C based on standardized Apache interfaces which are widely used.
Python Web Frameworks ---------------------
Virtually every Python web framework supports cookie based sessions, e.g. Django, Twisted, Zope, Turbogears etc. Early on in IPA we decided to avoid the use of these frameworks. Trying to pull in just one part of these frameworks just to get session support would be problematic because the code does not function outside it's framework.
IPA implemented sessions ------------------------
Originally it was believed the path of least effort was to utilize existing session support, most likely what would be provided by Apache. However there are enough basic modular components available in native Python and other standard packages it should be possible to provide session support meeting the aforementioned goals with a modest implementation effort. Because we're leveraging existing components the implementation difficulties are subsumed by other components which have already been field proven and have community support. This is a smart strategy.
Proposed Solution =================
Our interface to the web server is via WSGI which invokes a callback per request passing us an environmental context for the request. For this discussion we'll name the WSGI callback "application()", a conventional name in WSGI parlance.
Shared session data will be handled by memcached. We will create one instance of memcached on each server node dedicated to IPA exclusively. Communication with memcached will be via a UNIX socket located in the file system under /var/run/ipa_memcached. It will be protected by file permissions and optionally SELinux policy.
In application() we examine the request cookies and if there is an IPA session cookie with a session ID we retrieve the session data from our memcached instance.
The session data will be a Python dict. IPA components will read or write their session information by using a pre-agreed upon name (e.g. key) in the dict. This is a very flexible system and consistent with how we pass data in most parts of IPA.
If the session data is not available an empty session data dict will be created.
How does this session data travel with the request in the IPA pipeline? In IPA we use the HTTP request/response to implement RPC. In application() we convert the request into a procedure call passing it arguments derived from the HTTP request. The passed parameters are specific to the RPC method being invoked. The context the RPC call is executing in is not passed as an RPC parameter.
How would the contextual information such as session data be bound to the request and hence the RPC call?
In IPA when a RPC invocation is being prepared from a request we recognize this will only ever be processed serially by one Python thread. A thread local dict called "context" is allocated for each thread. The context dict is cleared in between requests (e.g. RPC method invocations). The per-thread context dict is populated during the lifetime of the request and is used as a global data structure unique to the request that various IPA component can read from and write to with the assurance the data is unique to the current request and/or method call.
The session data dict will be written into the context dict under the session key before the RPC method begins execution. Thus session data can be read and written by any IPA component by accessing ``context.session``.
When the RPC method finishes execution the session data bound to the request/method is retrieved from the context and written back to the memcached instance. The session ID is set in the response sent back to the client in the ``Set-Cookie`` header along with the flags controlling it's usage.
Issues and details ------------------
IPA code cannot depend on session data being present, however it should always update session data with the hope it will be available in the future. Session data may not be available because:
* This is the first request from the user and no session data has been created yet.
* The user may have cookies disabled.
* The session data may have been flushed. memcached operates with a fixed memory allocation and will flush entries on a LRU basis, like with any cache there is no guarantee of persistence.
Also we may have have deliberately expired or deleted session data, see below.
Cookie manipulation is done via the standard Python Cookie module.
Session cookies will be set to only persist as long as the browser has the session open. They will be tagged so the browser only returns the session ID on SSL secured HTTP requests. They will not be visible to Javascript in the browser.
Session ID's will be created by using 48 bits of random data and converted to 12 hexadecimal digits. Newly generated session ID's will be checked for prior existence to handle the unlikely case the random number repeats.
memcached will have significantly higher performance than a SQL or file based storage solution. Communication is effectively though a pipe (UNIX socket) using a very simple protocol and the data is held entirely in process memory. memcached also scales easily, it is easy to add more memcached processes and distribute the load across them. At this point in time we don't anticipate the need for this.
A very nice feature of the Python memcached module is that when a data item is written to the cache it is done with standard Python pickling (pickling is a standard Python mechanism to marshal and unmarshal Python objects). We adopt the convention the object written to cache will be a dict to meet our internal data handling conventions. The pickling code will recursively handle nested objects in the dict. Thus we gain a lot of flexibility using standard Python data structures to store and retrieve our session data without having to author and debug code to marshal and unmarshal the data if some other storage mechanism had been used. This is a significant implementation win. Of course some common sense limitations need to observed when deciding on what is written to the session cache keeping in mind the data is shared between processes and it should not be excessively large (a configurable option)
We can set an expiration on memcached entries. We may elect to do that to force session data to be refreshed periodically. For example we may wish the client to present fresh credentials on a periodic basis even if the cached credentials are otherwise within their validity period.
We can explicitly delete session data if for some reason we believe it is stale, invalid or compromised.
memcached also gives us certain facilities to prevent race conditions between different processes utilizing the cache. For example you can check of the entry has been modified since you last read it or use CAS (Check And Set) semantics. What has to be protected in terms of cache coherency will likely have to be determined as the session support is utilized and different data items are added to the cache. This is very much data and context specific. Fortunately memcached operations are atomic.
Controlling the memcached process ---------------------------------
We need a mechanism to start the memcached process and secure it so that only IPA components can access it.
Although memcached ships with both an initscript and systemd unit files those are for generic instances. We want a memcached instance dedicated exclusively to IPA usage. To accomplish this we would install a systemd unit file or an SysV initscript to control the IPA specific memcached service. ipactl would be extended to know about this additional service. systemd's cgroup facility would give us additional mechanisms to integrate the IPA memcached service within a larger IPA process group.
Protecting the memcached data would be done via file permissions (and optionally SELinux policy) on the UNIX domain socket. Although recent implementations of memcached support authentication via SASL this introduces a performance and complexity burden not warranted when cached is dedicated to our exclusive use and access controlled by OS mechanisms.
Conventionally daemons are protected by assigning a system uid and/or gid to the daemon. A daemon launched by root will drop it's privileges by assuming the effective uid:gid assigned to it. File system access is controlled by the OS via the effective identity and SELinux policy can be crafted based on the identity. Thus the memcached UNIX socket would be protected by having it owned by a specific system user and/or membership in a restricted system group (discounting for the moment SELinux).
Unfortunately we currently do not have an IPA system uid whose identity our processes operate under nor do we have an IPA system group. IPA does manage a collection of related processes (daemons) and historically each has been assigned their own uid. When these unrelated processes communicate they mutually authenticate via other mechanisms. We do not have much of a history of using shared file system objects across identities. When file objects are created they are typically assigned the identity of daemon needing to access the object and are not accessed by other daemons, or they carry root identity.
When our WSGI application runs in Apache it is run as a WSGI daemon. This means when Apache starts up it forks off WSGI processes for us and we are independent of other Apache processes. When WSGI is run in this mode there is the ability to set the uid:gid of the WSGI process hosting us, however we currently do not take advantage of this option. WSGI can be run in other modes as well, only in daemon mode can the uid:gid be independently set from the rest of Apache. All processes started by Apache can be set to a common uid:gid specified in the global Apache configuration, by default it's apache:apache. Thus when our IPA code executes it is running as apache:apache.
To protect our memcached UNIX socket we can do one of two things:
1. Assign it's uid:gid as apache:apache. This would limit access to our cache only to processes running under httpd. It's somewhat restricted but far from ideal. Any code running in the web server could potentially access our cache. It's difficult to control what the web server runs and admins may not understand the consequences of configuring httpd to serve other things besides IPA.
2. Create an IPA specific uid:gid, for example ipa:ipa. We then configure our WSGI application to run as the ipa:ipa user and group. We also configure our memcached instance to run as the ipa:ipa user and group. In this configuration we are now fully protected, only our WSGI code can read & write to our memcached UNIX socket.
However there may be unforeseen issues by converting our code to run as something other than apache:apache. This would require some investigation and testing.
IPA is dependent on other system daemons, specifically Directory Server (ds) and Certificate Server (cs). Currently we configure ds to run under the dirsrv:dirsrv user and group, an identity of our creation. We allow cs to default to it's pkiuser:pkiuser user and group. Should these other cooperating daemons also run under the common ipa:ipa user and group identities? At first blush there would seem to be an advantage to coalescing all process identities under a common IPA user and group identity. However these other processes do not depend on user and group permissions when working with external agents, processes, etc. Rather they are designed to be stand-alone network services which authenticate their clients via other mechanisms. They do depend on user and group permission to manage their own file system objects. If somehow the ipa user and/or group were compromised or malicious code somehow executed under the ipa identity there would be an advantage in having the cooperating processes cordoned off under their own identities providing one extra layer of protection. (Note, these cooperating daemons may not even be co-located on the same node in which case the issue is moot)
The UNIX socket behavior (ldapi) with Directory Server is as follows:
* The socket ownership is: root:root
* The socket permissions are: 0666
* When connecting via ldapi you must authenticate as you would normally with a TCP socket, except ...
* If autobind is enabled and the uid:gid is available via SO_PEERCRED and the uid:gid can be found in the set of users known to the Directory Server then that connection will be bound as that user.
* Otherwise an anonymous bind will occur.
memcached UNIX socket behavior is as follows:
* memcached can be invoked with a user argument, no group may be specified. The effective uid is the uid of the user argument and the effective gid is the primary group of the user, let's call this euid:egid
* The socket ownership is: euid:egid
* The socket permissions are 0700 by default, but this can be modified by the -a mask command line arg which sets the umask (defaults to 0700).
Overview of authentication in IPA =================================
This describes how we currently authenticate and how we plan to improve authentication performance. First some definitions.
There are 4 major players:
1. client 2. mod_auth_kerb (in Apache process) 3. wsgi handler (in IPA wsgi python process) 4. ds (directory server)
There are several resources:
1. /ipa/ui (unprotected, web UI static resources) 2. /ipa/xml (protected, xmlrpc RPC used by command line clients) 3. /ipa/json (protected, json RPC used by javascript in web UI) 4. ds (protected, wsgi acts as proxy, our LDAP server)
Current Model -------------
This describes how things work in our current system for the web UI.
1. Client requests /ipa/ui, this is unprotected, is static and contains no sensitive information. Apache replies with html and javascript. The javascript requests /ipa/json.
2. Client sends post to /ipa/json.
3. mod_auth_kerb is configured to protect /ipa/json, replies 401 authenticate negotiate.
4. Client resends with credentials
5. mod_auth_kerb validates credentials
a. if invalid replies 403 access denied (stops here)
b. if valid creates temporary ccache, adds KRB5CCNAME to request headers
6. Request passed to wsgi handler
a. validates request, KRB5CCNAME must be present, referrer, etc.
b. ccache saved and used to bind to ds
c. routes to specified RPC handler.
7. wsgi handler replies to client
Proposed new session based optimization ---------------------------------------
The round trip negotiate and credential validation in steps 3,4,5 is expensive. This can be avoided if we can cache the client credentials. With client sessions we can store the client credentials in the session bound to the client.
A few notes about the session implementation.
* based on session cookies, cookies must be enabled
* session cookie is secure, only passed on secure connections, only passed to our URL resource, never visible to client javascript etc.
* session cookie has a session id which is used by wsgi handler to retrieve client session data from shared multi-process cache.
Changes to Apache's resource protection ---------------------------------------
* /ipa/json is no longer protected by mod_auth_kerb. This is necessary to avoid the negotiate expense in steps 3,4,5 above. Instead the /ipa/json resource will be protected in our wsgi handler via the session cookie.
* A new protected URI is introduced, /ipa/login. This resource does no serve any data, it is used exclusively for authentication.
The new sequence is:
1. Client requests /ipa/ui, this is unprotected. Apache replies with html and javascript. The javascript requests /ipa/json.
2. Client sends post to /ipa/json, which is unprotected.
3. wsgi handler obtains session data from session cookie.
a. if ccache is present in session data and is valid
- request is further validated
- ccache is established for bind to ds
- request is routed to RPC handler
- wsgi handler eventually replies to client
b. if ccache is not present or not valid processing continues ...
4. wsgi handler replies with 401 Unauthorized
5. client sends request to /ipa/login to obtain session credentials
6. mod_auth_kerb replies 401 negotiate on /ipa/login
7. client sends credentials to /ipa/login
8. mod_auth_kerb validates credentials
a. if valid
- mod_auth_kerb permits access to /ipa/login. wsgi handler is invoked and does the following:
* establishes session for client
* retrieves the ccache from KRB5CCNAME and stores it
a. if invalid
- mod_auth_kerb sends 403 access denied (processing stops)
9. client now posts the same data again to /ipa/json including session cookie. Processing repeats starting at step 2 and since the session data now contains a valid ccache step 3a executes, a successful reply is sent to client.
Command line client using xmlrpc --------------------------------
The above describes the web UI utilizing the json RPC mechanism. The IPA command line tools utilize a xmlrpc RPC mechanism on the same HTTP server. Access to the xmlrpc is via the /ipa/xml URI. The json and xmlrpc API's are the same, they differ only on how their procedure calls are marshalled and unmarshalled.
Under the new scheme /ipa/xml will continue to be Kerberos protected at all times. Apache's mod_auth_kerb will continue to require the client provides valid Kerberos credentials.
When the WSGI handler routes to /ipa/xml the Kerberos credentials will be extracted from the KRB5CCNAME environment variable as provided by mod_auth_kerb. Everything else remains the same.
'''
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
return time.strftime(ISO8601_DATETIME_FMT, time.localtime(timestamp))
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
''' This class is an abstract base class and is meant to be subclassed to provide actual functionality. The purpose is to encapsulate all the callbacks one might need to manage authenticaion. Different authentication mechanisms will instantiate a subclass of this and register it with the SessionAuthManger. When an authentication event occurs the matching method will be called for each registered class. This allows the SessionAuthManager to notify interested parties. '''
''' Called when a user requests to be logged out of their session.
:parameters: session_data The current session data :returns: None ''' self.debug('AuthManager.logout.%s:', self.name)
''' '''
''' '''
raise KeyError('cannot register auth manager named "%s" one already exists, name="%s" object=%s', name, existing_mgr.name, repr(existing_mgr))
raise TypeError('auth_mgr must be an instance of AuthManager, not %s', auth_mgr.__class__.__name__)
self.debug('SessionAuthManager.unregister: name=%s', name)
if not self.auth_managers.has_key(name): raise KeyError('cannot unregister auth manager named "%s", does not exist', name) del self.auth_managers[name]
''' ''' self.debug('SessionAuthManager.logout:')
for auth_mgr in self.auth_managers.values(): try: auth_mgr.logout(session_data) except Exception, e: self.error('%s auth_mgr logout failed: %s', auth_mgr.name, e)
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
''' This class is used to manage a set of sessions. Each client connecting to the server is assigned a session id wich is then used to store data bound to the client's session in between server requests. '''
''' :returns: `SessionManager` object '''
''' Return a random string to be used as a session id.
This implementation creates a string of hexadecimal digits. There is no guarantee of uniqueness, it is the caller's responsibility to validate the returned id is not currently in use.
:parameters: n_bits number of bits of random data, will be rounded to next highest multiple of 4 :returns: string of random hexadecimal digits ''' # round up to multiple of 4 n_bits = (n_bits + 3) & ~3 session_id = '%0*x' % (n_bits >> 2, random.getrandbits(n_bits)) return session_id
''' Returns a new *unique* session id. See `generate_session_id()` for how the session id's are formulated.
The scope of the uniqueness of the id is limited to id's generated by this instance of the `SessionManager`.
:parameters: max_retries Maximum number of attempts to produce a unique id. :returns: Unique session id as a string. ''' n_retries = 0 while n_retries < max_retries: session_id = self.generate_session_id() if not session_id in self.generated_session_ids: break n_retries += 1 if n_retries >= max_retries: self.error('could not allocate unique new session_id, %d retries exhausted', n_retries) raise errors.ExecutionError(message=_('could not allocate unique new session_id')) self.generated_session_ids.add(session_id) return session_id
'''
This class is used to assign a session id to a HTTP server client and then store client specific data associated with the session in a memcached memory cache instance. Multiple processes may share the memory cache permitting session data to be shared between forked HTTP server children handling server requests.
The session id is guaranteed to be unique.
The session id is set into a session cookie returned to the client and is secure (see `generate_cookie()`). Future requests from the client will send the session id which is then used to retrieve the session data (see `load_session_data()`) '''
''' :returns: `MemcacheSessionManager` object. '''
''' Return memcached server statistics.
Return value is a dict whose keys are server names and whose value is a dict of key/value statistics as returned by the memcached server.
:returns: dict of server names, each value is dict of key/value server statistics.
''' match = self.mc_server_stat_name_re.search(server[0]) if match: name = match.group(1) result[name] = server[1] else: self.warning('unparseable memcached server name "%s"', server[0])
''' Check if all configured memcached servers are running and can be communicated with.
:returns: True if at least one server is configured and all servers can respond, False otherwise.
'''
return False
''' Returns a new *unique* session id. See `generate_session_id()` for how the session id's are formulated.
The scope of the uniqueness of the id is limited to id's generated by this instance of the `SessionManager` and session id's currently stored in the memcache instance.
:parameters: max_retries Maximum number of attempts to produce a unique id. :returns: Unique session id as a string. ''' n_retries = 0 while n_retries < max_retries: session_id = super(MemcacheSessionManager, self).new_session_id(max_retries) session_data = self.get_session_data(session_id) if session_data is None: break n_retries += 1 if n_retries >= max_retries: self.error('could not allocate unique new session_id, %d retries exhausted', n_retries) raise errors.ExecutionError(message=_('could not allocate unique new session_id')) return session_id
''' Return a new session data dict. The session data will be associated with it's session id. The dict will be pre-populated with:
session_id The session ID used to identify this session data. session_start_timestamp Timestamp when this session was created. session_access_timestamp Timestamp when the session was last accessed. session_expiration_timestamp Timestamp when session expires. Defaults to zero which implies no expiration. See `set_session_expiration_time()`.
:parameters: session_id The session id used to look up this session data. :returns: Session data dict populated with a session_id key. '''
now = time.time() return {'session_id' : session_id, 'session_start_timestamp' : now, 'session_access_timestamp' : now, 'session_expiration_timestamp' : 0, }
''' Given a session id return a memcache key used to look up the session data in the memcache.
:parameters: session_id The session id from which the memcache key will be derived. :returns: A key (string) used to look up the session data in the memcache. ''' return 'ipa.session.%s' % (session_id)
''' Given a session id retrieve the session data associated with it. If no session data exists for the session id return None.
:parameters: session_id The session id whose session data is desired. :returns: Session data if found, None otherwise. ''' session_key = self.session_key(session_id) session_data = self.mc.get(session_key)
if session_data is not None: # update the access timestamp now = time.time() session_data['session_access_timestamp'] = now
return session_data
''' Parse an HTTP cookie header and search for our session id. Return the session id if found, return None if not found.
:parameters: cookie_header An HTTP cookie header. May be None, if None return None. :returns: Session id as string or None if not found. '''
if cookie_header is None: return None
session_id = None
try: session_cookie = Cookie.get_named_cookie_from_string(cookie_header, self.session_cookie_name) except Exception, e: session_cookie = None if session_cookie: session_id = session_cookie.value
if session_id is None: self.debug('no session cookie found') else: self.debug('found session cookie_id = %s', session_id)
return session_id
''' Parse an HTTP cookie header looking for our session information.
* If no session id is found then a new session id and new session data dict will be generated, stored in the memcache and returned. The new session data dict will contain the new session id.
* If the session id is found in the cookie an attempt is made to retrieve the session data from the memcache using the session id.
- If existing session data is found in the memcache it is returned.
- If no session data is found in the memcache then a new session data dict will be generated, stored in the memcache and returned. The new session data dict will contain the session id found in the cookie header.
:parameters: cookie_header An HTTP cookie header. May be None. :returns: Session data dict containing at a minimum the session id it is bound to. '''
session_id = self.get_session_id_from_http_cookie(cookie_header) if session_id is None: session_id = self.new_session_id() self.debug('no session id in request, generating empty session data with id=%s', session_id) session_data = self.new_session_data(session_id) self.store_session_data(session_data) return session_data else: session_data = self.get_session_data(session_id) if session_data is None: self.debug('no session data in cache with id=%s, generating empty session data', session_id) session_data = self.new_session_data(session_id) self.store_session_data(session_data) return session_data else: self.debug('found session data in cache with id=%s', session_id) return session_data
''' Store the supplied session_data dict in the memcached instance.
The session_expiration_timestamp is always passed to memcached when the session data is written back to the memcache. This is because otherwise the memcache expiration will default to zero if it's not specified which implies no expiration. Thus a failure to specify an exiration time when writing an item to memcached will cause a previously set expiration time for the item to be discarded and the item will no longer expire.
:parameters: session_data Session data dict, must contain session_id key.
:returns: session_id ''' session_id = session_data['session_id'] session_key = self.session_key(session_id)
# update the access timestamp now = time.time() session_data['session_access_timestamp'] = now
session_expiration_timestamp = session_data['session_expiration_timestamp']
self.debug('store session: session_id=%s start_timestamp=%s access_timestamp=%s expiration_timestamp=%s', session_id, fmt_time(session_data['session_start_timestamp']), fmt_time(session_data['session_access_timestamp']), fmt_time(session_data['session_expiration_timestamp']))
self.mc.set(session_key, session_data, time=session_expiration_timestamp) return session_id
''' Return a session cookie containing the session id. The cookie will be contrainted to the url path, defined for use with HTTP only, and only returned on secure connections (SSL).
:parameters: url_path The cookie will be returned in a request if it begins with this url path. session_id The session id identified by the session cookie add_header If true format cookie string with Set-Cookie: header
:returns: cookie string '''
if not expiration: # Catch zero unix timestamps expiration = None;
cookie = Cookie(self.session_cookie_name, session_id, domain=urlparse.urlparse(api.env.xmlrpc_uri).netloc, path=url_path, httponly=True, secure=True, expires=expiration) if add_header: result = 'Set-Cookie: %s' % cookie else: result = str(cookie)
return result
duration=default_max_session_duration, max_age=None, duration_type='inactivity_timeout'): ''' memcached permits setting an expiration time on entries. The expiration time may either be Unix time (number of seconds since January 1, 1970, as a 32-bit value), or a number of seconds starting from current time. In the latter case, this number of seconds may not exceed 60*60*24*30 (number of seconds in 30 days); if the number sent by a client is larger than that, the server will consider it to be real Unix time value rather than an offset from current time.
We never use the duration value (< 30 days), we always use a timestamp, this makes it easier to integrate with other time constraints.
When a session is created it's start time is recorded in the session data as the session_start_timestamp value.
There are two ways the expiration timestamp can be computed:
from_start A session has a fixed duration beginning with the start of the session. The session expires when the duration interval has elapsed relative to the start of the session. inactivity_timeout A session times out after a period of inactivity. The expiration time is advanced by the value of the duration interval everytime the session is updated.
After the expiration is computed it may be capped at a maximum value due to other constraints (e.g. authentication credential expiration). If the optional max_age parameter is specified then expiration is constrained to be not greater than the max_age.
The final computed expiration is then written into the session_data as the session_expiration_timestamp value. The session_expiration_timestamp is always passed to memcached when the session data is written back to the memcache. This is because otherwise the memcache expiration will default to zero if it's not specified which implies no expiration. Thus a failure to specify an exiration time when writing an item to memcached will cause a previously set expiration time for the item to be discarded and the item will no longer expire.
:parameters: session_data Session data dict, must contain session_id key. duration Number of seconds cache entry should live. This is a duration value, not a timestamp. Zero implies no expiration. max_age Unix time value when cache entry must expire by.
:returns: expiration timestamp, zero implies no expiration '''
if duration == 0 and max_age is None: # No expiration expiration = 0 session_data['session_expiration_timestamp'] = expiration return expiration
if duration_type == 'inactivity_timeout': now = time.time() session_data['session_access_timestamp'] = now expiration = now + duration elif duration_type == 'from_start': session_start_timestamp = session_data['session_start_timestamp'] expiration = session_start_timestamp + duration else: # Don't throw an exception, it's critical the session be # given some expiration, instead log the error and execute # a default action of expiring the session 5 minutes after # it was initiated (similar to from_start but with # hardcoded duration) default = 60*5 self.warning('unknown session duration_type (%s), defaulting to %s seconds from session start', duration_type, default) session_start_timestamp = session_data['session_start_timestamp'] expiration = session_start_timestamp + default
# Cap the expiration if max_age is specified if max_age is not None: expiration = min(expiration, max_age)
session_data['session_expiration_timestamp'] = expiration
self.debug('set_session_expiration_time: duration_type=%s duration=%s max_age=%s expiration=%s (%s)', duration_type, duration, max_age, expiration, fmt_time(expiration))
return expiration
''' Given a session id removed the session data bound to the id from the memcache.
:parameters: session_id The ID of the session which should be removed from the cache. :returns: None ''' session_key = self.session_key(session_id)
self.debug('delete session data from memcache, session_id=%s', session_id) self.mc.delete(session_key)
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
return os.path.join(krbccache_dir, '%s%s' % (krbccache_prefix, os.getpid()))
if scheme == 'FILE': name = os.path.join(krbccache_dir, '%s%s' % (krbccache_prefix, os.getpid())) else: raise ValueError('ccache scheme "%s" unsupported', scheme)
ccache_name = krb5_unparse_ccache(scheme, name) return ccache_name
scheme, name = krb5_parse_ccache(ccache_name) if scheme == 'FILE': root_logger.debug('reading ccache data from file "%s"', name) src = open(name) ccache_data = src.read() src.close() return ccache_data else: raise ValueError('ccache scheme "%s" unsupported (%s)', scheme, ccache_name)
if scheme == 'FILE': name = _get_krbccache_pathname() root_logger.debug('storing ccache data into file "%s"', name) dst = open(name, 'w') dst.write(ccache_data) dst.close() else: raise ValueError('ccache scheme "%s" unsupported', scheme)
ccache_name = krb5_unparse_ccache(scheme, name) os.environ['KRB5CCNAME'] = ccache_name return ccache_name
''' Stop using the current request's ccache. * Remove KRB5CCNAME from the enviroment * Remove the ccache file from the file system
Note, we do not demand any of these elements exist, but if they do we'll remove them. '''
if os.environ.has_key('KRB5CCNAME'): if ccache_name != os.environ['KRB5CCNAME']: root_logger.error('release_ipa_ccache: ccache_name (%s) != KRB5CCNAME environment variable (%s)', ccache_name, os.environ['KRB5CCNAME']) del os.environ['KRB5CCNAME'] else: root_logger.debug('release_ipa_ccache: KRB5CCNAME environment variable not set')
scheme, name = krb5_parse_ccache(ccache_name) if scheme == 'FILE': if os.path.exists(name): try: os.unlink(name) except Exception, e: root_logger.error('unable to delete session ccache file "%s", %s', name, e) else: raise ValueError('ccache scheme "%s" unsupported (%s)', scheme, ccache_name)
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
''' RPC command used to log the current user out of their session. '''
session_data = getattr(context, 'session_data', None) if session_data is None: self.debug('session logout command: no session_data found') else: session_id = session_data.get('session_id') self.debug('session logout command: session_id=%s', session_id)
# Notifiy registered listeners session_mgr.auth_mgr.logout(session_data)
return dict(result=None)
#-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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